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often exists when there is a common
ideology between state and proxy.
Sanctioning is a relationship whereby the
proxy is permitted to engage in malicious activities, so long as the ends align
with the goals of the state. An example
is Russian criminal organizations that
are permitted to operate as long as they
target only non-Russians with their
criminal activities and occasionally
turn their skills to patriotic purposes.
The next two sections are the strength
of Maurer’s book. He closely examines
all three proxy relationships, identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of each
type and using historical examples to
illustrate his conclusions. Maurer clearly
establishes historically the benefit of
proxies to states and explains why
states are likely to use cyber proxies as
a tool for the foreseeable future. Maurer
also does identify the standards for
international legal responsibility that
states bear for their proxies; however,
after initially identifying these standards,
he discusses them only minimally
throughout his later case studies.
National security practitioners likely
will gain the most insight from these
case studies, in which Maurer applies his
analytical framework to the use of proxies by the United States, Iran, Russia,
and China. Drawing on the most recent
events to highlight the use of cyber proxies by these states, he weaves together
the economic, social, and political realities of each state and analyzes how these
factors affect its use of proxies. Although
it is tempting to view proxy relationships as being determined solely by the
governmental actors, Maurer reveals
how proxies often are a natural outgrowth of their societies. For example,
he discusses how a combination of
excellent technical training and poor job
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prospects has led to the increased use
of sanctioning as a proxy relationship in
countries of the former Soviet Union.
In conclusion, Cyber Mercenaries is both
enjoyable to read and an important
contribution to scholarship on the study
of cyber conflicts. It dispels many of the
myths and misunderstandings surrounding the use of proxies and provides an
analytical framework that can be applied
easily when following news reporting
on international conflicts in cyberspace.
It should be on the bookshelf of every
scholar and practitioner in this vital
field of national security studies.
JEFFREY BILLER

Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the
U-boats, 1943–45, by Robert Forsyth. Oxford,
U.K.: Osprey, 2017. 312 pages. $30.

As the Second World War recedes ever
further into the past, more and more
works emerge that focus on historical
back pastures or operations either
overlooked or examined only lightly
until now. Shadow over the Atlantic is an
example of such works, but it is also a
welcome contribution to understanding
the vital Axis anticonvoy campaign and
the role of the Luftwaffe in waging war
at sea. Robert Forsyth is an experienced
author, with a specialty in World War
II German aircraft. He tells the story of
the attempts by the German navy and
air force to coordinate operations so
as to maneuver Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
U-boats into position to savage Allied
convoys. In doing so, Forsyth focuses
nearly exclusively on the operations of
Long-Range Reconnaissance Group
5, Atlantic (designated FAGr-5).
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Arguably, the most well-known German aircraft of the convoy war was
the Focke-Wulf 200 Condor. FAGr-5
instead flew the newer, lesser-known,
four-engine, twin-tailed Junkers (Ju)
290. Forsyth, with the passion of
the true enthusiast, goes into great
detail concerning the development and
construction of the aircraft. No significant aspect of the plane is overlooked,
from cockpit controls to armaments
to the background color of the FAGr-5
emblem. Aircraft enthusiasts will find
this detailed information of great
interest, but lay readers may find just
a bit too much emphasis on—at times
literally—the nuts and bolts of the Ju-290.
By 1943, the tide in the U-boat war
was turning against Admiral Dönitz,
Germany’s supreme submarine admiral.
His best commanders were dying, the
ratio of U-boat losses to Allied tonnage
sunk was rising, and the amount of
ocean free from Allied air surveillance
was decreasing rapidly. German air
reconnaissance was deemed essential
if there was to be any realistic hope
of bringing wolf packs into action
against the convoys, and thereby truly
hurting the Allied war effort. Had the
German navy possessed its own air arm,
it might have been easier to provide
this; instead, the Luftwaffe never was
willing to give maritime reconnaissance
anything like the support it needed.
Forsyth details how FAGr-5 went about
its duties. He describes how search
patterns were established and flown. The
nascent use of airdropped buoys to try to
track convoys and serve as navigational
beacons is examined, as are efforts to
use other emerging technologies.
For the pilots and aircrews of FAGr-5,
Atlantic reconnaissance missions were
long, demanding, and increasingly

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/17

Autumn2018Review.indb 156

dangerous as Allied air coverage became
more proficient and pervasive. Missions
routinely exceeded twelve hours in duration. Weather conditions frequently were
miserable, which also increased the risk
of navigational error and mishap. Allied
escort carriers and long-range, landbased fighter-bomber patrols increased
in number, downing several of the
group’s Ju-290s and damaging others.
Forsyth tracks the losses and replacement of the group’s aircraft with great
care, to a level at which it is possible
to track individual airframes over the
period. His accounts of air-to-air combat
are analytical and detailed. Allied
reports are included to good effect.
Over the period discussed, attempts to
direct U-boats into positions to attack
convoys became less and less effective.
Forsyth explains that this was owing
in large part to the Allied ability to
intercept and decode German radio
traffic. This effort was so effective that
the British often knew when Ju-290s
were actually on patrol and when the
next aircraft would be airborne.
After the invasion of Normandy in
June 1944, things became increasingly
difficult for FAGr-5. Resistance elements began affecting the squadrons’
operations. At times, the group formed
ground-combat units and cleared local
villages of resistance fighters, taking
losses in the process. Getting supplies
and needed parts from Germany took
ever longer. Morale was low, but, as
the records Forsyth accessed make
clear, no one admitted such “defeatist”
sentiments. During the same month as
the Allied invasion, one of the group’s
more unusual missions was the rescue of
German meteorologists from Greenland.
Inevitably, FAGr-5 eventually flew its
last missions over the Atlantic. Group
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aircraft then departed for friendly
fields in Germany—leaving the ground
element to get out of France on its
own. The account of the latter’s trek
across France—in an eclectic convoy of
vehicles with cobbled-together armaments and increasingly diverse groups
of personnel who joined during the
retreat—makes for fascinating reading.
The trip was not without danger, and
several firefights erupted between group
personnel and French resistance units.
Yet for all the excellent detail that
Shadow over the Atlantic provides
concerning FAGr-5, the human element
is lacking. The planes and the operations
are the center of attention; the men of
the group are identified only rarely.
There is the occasional mention of
encouraging sports to boost morale or
how the loss of a crew was unfortunate,
but in the end the vast majority of the
men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, USA
(Ret.). Foreword by General Martin Dempsey,
USA (Ret.). Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky,
2016. 238 pages. $50.

Writer, lecturer, retired general officer,
and PhD, James Dubik has made a
significant contribution to military
scholarship and the practice of war
fighting with this book. He has introduced a major revision in just war
theory that undoubtedly will transform
the viewpoint of supporters and critics
on this philosophical tradition in applied
ethics. Dubik understands that his
proposed revision will not answer all
objections and naturally will be subject
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to claims of deficiencies and other
criticisms, but he rightly argues that his
revised defense of the just war tradition
advances a new perspective—one
that undeniably will alter the way in
which current and future generations
interpret the justification of war.
Demonstrating a mastery of detail
and a clarity of understanding, Dubik
persuasively employs the methodology
of historiography to support and defend
his war-waging principles, basing
them on examples from the Civil War,
World War II, the Vietnam War, and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
methodological technique, reminiscent
of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (Basic Books, 1977), is both
convincing and engaging for those who
study history and the art of war. By
contrast with those who are academics
and stress concepts primarily and praxis
secondarily, as well as with those who
are warfighters and stress praxis primarily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a
former Army general who experienced
the challenges of warfare, yet is now a
professor at Georgetown University. He
balances both theory and practice in Just
War Reconsidered, his magnum opus.
Although Dubik respects and acknowledges the profound contribution to just
war theory made by Walzer—as part of
a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Aristotle, Augustine,
Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius,
to name only a few—he criticizes the
customary separation of jus ad bellum
(justice in going to war) and jus in bello
(justice in waging war). Walzer presents
the usual understanding: that senior civil
leaders debate the criteria that justify
going to war, represented by jus ad bellum, and then, once a national decision
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